Review for Exam #1

Hi, everyone!  Exam #1 is scheduled for Wednesday, February 12, in our regular classroom, during our regular class time.  You’ll have 75 minutes to complete the exam, though you probably won’t need that.  All you need to bring to the exam is a writing utensil (preferably a pen).  To prepare for the exam, you should make use of the readings, lectures, class discussions, and the blog assignment on ways around the free rider problem (including your colleagues’ comments).  If you want to ask me questions, there are three ways to do it:

1.        Email me at the address on the syllabus (berchnorto@msn.com).  I will generally respond quickly, but I may be slowed from about 10 am Friday to Monday evening (note again that there is no class on Monday, February 10, as I’ll be away on University business).  I hope to be able to respond, but that’s not totally guaranteed.  I will respond emailed questions until 1 pm on the day of the exam.

2.       You may post a question in the comments section of this blog post (this has been very effective in other classes).  However, I’m really unlikely to be able to answer them between 10 am Friday and Monday evening.  I’ll do what I can, but I’ll catch up on Monday night.  I will answer any questions posted on the blog before 11 am on the day of the exam (technical reasons for the earlier deadline).  I urge you to take a look at the comments on Wednesday before the exam, so you can take advantage of the questions asked by your colleaguges.

3.       I will have office hours on the day of the exam from 1:45 to 3:20.

The format of the exam is simple.  There will be two essay questions focusing on the formation and maintenance of interest groups, and you will need to answer both of them (probably in 1-3 pages each).  Here are general descriptions of the questions, though you should make sure to read the specific questions on the exam and answer them in all their parts:

1.       You will be asked to explain why not every interest forms an interest group.  You’ll want to take advantage of the notion of concentrated benefits and diffuse costs, the free rider problem, and Olson’s insights into why it is much easier for smaller, privileged groups (or even intermediate groups) to form, as opposed to larger, latent groups.

2.       You will be asked to explain why some large, latent groups manage to form and perhaps even maintain themselves over time despite the insight that Olson offers into the free rider problem.  You may be asked about specific groups.  You should be prepared to discuss the different kinds of selective incentives, conditional cooperation, federation, miscalculation of costs and benefits, low costs, political entrepeneurs, and altruism, as well as any other ideas you may have.

Good luck!--NB

Solving the Free Rider Problem

This first blog assignment is worth 15 points (out of 100 blog points for the semester), and it is due at 3 pm on Wednesday, January 29.  Answers should probably be at least two paragraphs.  Better answers are thoughtful, address the comments of your colleagues (politely), and bring in other readings.

The free rider problem is key to understanding interest groups.  Some groups, often potentially large ones, fail to organize or to maintain themselves due to all potential members making the same calculation that their participation will not have an appreciable impact on the group's chances of success, that there are costs to participating, and that, if the group is successful, they will garner the benefits of the group's success whether they participated in its efforts or not.

Olson talks about this at length, focusing on the problems facing large, latent groups, and considering the possibilities for overcoming the free rider problem through the use of selective incentives of various sorts, which are only available to those who participate in the group's efforts.  He also considers the possibility of federation.

In class, in the game we played on Wednesday, we simulated the free rider problem.  While I'm not able to report precise results because a good number of you filled out the sheet incorrectly, I can report from class that scores (a measure of cooperation) rose from our initial single to trial to the first series of trials where we repeated the game 10 times (people learned and perhaps having a long-term relationship would make a difference).  That part of the experiment where we tried to see whether scores would rise if we paired people with other relationships outside of class failed, in part due to small numbers falling into that category.  We then tested whether scores would go up if we allowed opponents to talk before the game.  They did, as several pairs reached agreements to cooperate, offered conditional cooperation ("I'll cooperate as long as you do"), or otherwise strategized together (though several of these agreements broke down at the end of the game).  Finally, with the offer of extra credit on the line, cooperation declined in most cases, except for the one pairing where one opponent cooperated every time while their counterpart refused to cooperate, thus earning the latter a perfect score and the extra credit.

Finally, I'd like you to take a look at an article by British Professor Karina Whitehead, who argues that while conditional cooperation is a factor, there are several more mundane explanations for why people overcome the free rider problem all the time.  Her article can be found at https://winster.nottingham.ac.uk/cedex/documents/papers/2006-03.pdf 

Given all of this and our discussion in class, why do you think that some large groups are able to overcome the free rider problem and others are not?  Be specific, give examples (you may want to consider the case of SALA from last week), and make certain to indicate what you think of Olson's theory and Whitehead's ideas as well.  Good luck!--NB