Monday, April 21, 2014

Review for Final Exam

The final exam in this class will take place on Thursday, May 1, in our regular classroom, between 7 pm and 9 pm.  The exam will be comprehensive, though it will also focus more directly on material covered since the last exam (Olson's Rise and Decline of Nations).  The exam will consist of three questions, all of which will be mandatory:

1.  There will be a 20 point question that asks you to discuss your term paper and those of other students (be sure to read the last blog assignment's comments).
2.  There will be a 30 point question asking you to summarize and evaluate the Olson book using evidence from the book, lectures, class discussions, and the blog assignment on that book (be sure to read your colleagues' excellent analysis in the blog comments!).
3.  There will be a 50 point question related to the theme of the class:  the relationship between interest groups and democracy.  This will ask you to use the course materials (readings, blog assignments, lectures, class discussions, and other exercises) to answer a basic question.  You will be expected to use material from multiple sections of the course, but you will not be required to use any single particular item.

For those who want to discuss the material and ask questions, in addition to the review in class on Monday, April 21, you will have the following opportunities:
1.  I will have my regular office hours on Wednesday, April 23.
2.  I will have extra office hours on Friday, April 25, from 12:00 to 12:45, and on Monday, April 28, from 12:30 to 2:30.
3.  You may email questions until 10 am on the day of the exam.
4.  You may post questions in the comments section of this post until 10 am on the day of the exam.  Don't forget to check back on exam day to read the answers to your colleagues' questions.

Note again that there will be no class on Wednesday, April 23.  Instead, I will be administering makeup exams during class time (in our regular room) to those who had excused absences from one of the earlier exams.

Good luck!

Wednesday, April 16, 2014

Last Blog Assignment

Hi, everyone!  The end is in sight!  People did an excellent job on this week's blog assignment.  To review the schedule, on Monday, April 21, papers are due by class time.  If you still haven't seen the paper topics (that would be bad), they are on the blog in an entry below.  Also on Monday, I will distribute the review sheet for the final exam and be available to talk about it in class.  I'll have regular office hours next week (April 21 and 23), and I'll have office hours to be announced on Monday, April 28.  The final exam (cumulative, with an emphasis on the last book) is on Thursday, May 1, in our regular room, from 7 pm to 9 pm. 

So, your final blog assignment, worth 15 points, is simple.  After you finish your paper, write a one paragraph summary of your paper in the comments section below (feel free to argue gently with your colleagues).  You should also make sure, before the final, to read all the comments.  Comments are due on Wednesday, April 23, at class time.  Note, however, that there is no class that day.  Rather, I will administer makeup exams to those who missed one of the exams with an excused absence (I think there are only people taking exam #2; please correct me via email if I'm wrong).--NB

Thursday, April 10, 2014

Do Interest Groups Damage the Economy?

In his book,  The Rise and Decline of Nations, that all of you have been reading with great interest, Mancur Olson argues that interest groups are often a detriment to the economy.  Specifically, he claims that, over time, more potential groups find a way to overcome the free rider problem.  Thus, time in a stable polity leads to the formation of more (narrow) interest groups.  Groups lead to demands on government, which increases the size of government (which in turn slows economic growth).  Further, groups are inefficient and make it harder to adapt to technological change.  This, too, slows the economy.

Olson tests his theory in a number of ways, particularly using data from the 50 US states, as well as Western economies.  He generally finds that his theory is correct.  Others disagree with him.

Your task is to analyze Olson's theory and his evidence.  Making use of the book, our class discussions, and other readings (use Googlescholar to find oodles of pieces that extend and critique Olson's book), what do you think of Olson's theory?  Does the evidence support his theory?  Be as specific as possible.

This assignment is worth 25 points, and it is due at 5:00 pm on Wednesday, April 16.  Good luck!

Friday, March 28, 2014

Review for Exam #2

Hi, everyone!  Exam #2 is scheduled for Wednesday, April 2, in our regular classroom, during our regular class time.  You’ll have 75 minutes to complete the exam, though you probably won’t need that.  All you need to bring to the exam is a writing utensil (preferably a pen).  To prepare for the exam, you should make use of the readings, lectures, class discussions, and the blog (including your colleagues’ comments).  If you want to ask me questions, there are three ways to do it:

1.        Email me at the address on the syllabus (berchnorto@msn.com).  I will respond emailed questions until 1 pm on the day of the exam.

2.       You may post a question in the comments section of this blog post (this has been very effective in other classes).  I will answer any questions posted on the blog before 11 am on the day of the exam (technical reasons for the earlier deadline).  I urge you to take a look at the comments on Wednesday before the exam, so you can take advantage of the questions asked by your colleagues.

3.       I will have office hours on the day of the exam(as well as on Monday, March 31) from 1:45 to 3:20.

The format of the exam is simple.  There will be three essay questions chosen from the list below.  You will be required to answer two of those questions.  Given that you have the questions ahead of time, I will expect high-quality answers that make use of the readings, lectures, discussions, and blog assignments where appropriate. 

1.        Many believe that the 2010 Citizens United decision has dramatically changed the landscape of campaigns and elections.  Describe the major provisions in that decision, as well as its impact on court cases that followed it.  Using evidence and reasoning from the Interest Groups Unleashed book, our lectures and class discussions, and any other information you wish, assess the impact of the decision on campaigns and elections.  Be as specific as possible.

2.       There is little doubt that interest groups in the US are strong and growing stronger.  Some say this is good for democracy; others say it is bad.  What are the major arguments on each side?  Who is right, and why?  Be as specific as possible.

3.       Some argue that shifting to a parliamentary system (specifically, a Westminster system like that in England or Canada) would curb the power of interest groups in the United States.  Others say it will not have much of an impact (or will even increase interest group power).  Taking into account the readings, lectures, discussions, and especially the blog assignment on this topic, what are the major arguments on each side?  Who is right, and why?  Be as specific as possible.

4.       While a great deal of attention has been focused on the role of interest groups in elections, some say that their lobbying efforts are at least as important (and don’t receive enough attention).  Making particular use of chapters 10-15 of the Cigler and Loomis book, what are some major recent developments in lobbying?  In your view, is lobbying as important as the electoral activities of interest groups?  Explain, using reasons and evidence.

Tuesday, March 18, 2014

Would a Parliamentary System Curb Interest Group Power?

Some say that the reason interest groups are so powerful in the US is due to the system of checks and balances (as well as the two party system).  So, they claim, in order to reduce the power of interest groups, we need to switch to a parliamentary system (perhaps with proportional representation).  Others claim that interest groups would be just as powerful in such a system.  You need to answer three questions:
1.  Would a shift to a parliamentary system reduce the power of interest groups?
2.  Would that only happen if it were accompanied by a shift to proportional representation?
3.  In light of that, as well as your view of the current role of interest groups, would such a shift be a good or bad thing?  Explain.

You should consider the things we've talked about in class, as well as the readings where relevant, but you should also head out into the vastness of the Internet and consider the wide array of arguments that people have made on these questions.  Value academic sources over journalistic sources, but value both over random ramblings of someone with a laptop.  Again, feel free to engage in spirited but civil debate with your colleagues.

Blog assignments are due by 7 am on Wednesday, March 26, and they are worth 25 points.  Good luck!--NB

Friday, March 7, 2014

Paper Assignment


POLS 317

N BERCH

SPRING 2014

 

Paper Assignment

 

You are to write a paper of 7-10 (typed and double-spaced) pages, addressing one of the following questions.  The paper is due in class on Monday, April 21.  Late papers will be penalized 10 points per day.  You should make use of the course readings, lectures, discussions, and blog assignments, where appropriate, and you should do some additional reading as well.  When you cite the words or ideas of those other than yourself, you should cite them in an appropriate fashion.  Please ask if you have questions along the way.  Good luck!

 

1.        In The Logic of Collective Action, Mancur Olson claims that many interests will not form an interest group due to the free rider problem.  He also discusses possible solutions to the free rider problem.  Summarize Olson’s theory.  In the real world, when is he right, and when is he wrong?  Be as specific as possible.

2.       In The Rise and Decline of Nations, Mancur Olson argues that interest groups accrue over time, make demands on government, and eventually slow the rate of economic growth.  Summarize his theory.  Is his theory correct?  Explain.

3.       "Last week, the Supreme Court reversed a century of law that I believe will open the floodgates for special interests – including foreign corporations – to spend without limit in our elections."—Barack Obama, State of the Union Address, 2010.  Is he right?  Why or why not?

4.       Are interest groups, on balance, good for democracy or bad for democracy?  Consider both sides and defend a position with reasons and evidence.

5.       Some argue that the only way to curb interest group influence in American politics is to shift to a parliamentary system, reducing the importance of checks and balances and, in turn strengthening political parties.  Evaluate that claim, and the pros and cons of such a shift, using reasons and evidence.

Thursday, February 20, 2014

Do Interest Groups Contribute to Democracy in Elections?

Hi, everyone!  This blog assignment, worth 20 points and due by 7 am on Monday, March 3, will foreshadow one of the possible topics for the final paper assignment.  This week's readings in Cigler and Loomis, as well as Wednesday's lecture, make it clear that interest groups have  exploded as an influence in the US electoral process.  Some argue that this is bad for democracy, that it's all about money, that campaigns have been degraded.  Others argue that more interests are represented than ever before, and more people have a voice through interest groups than they would through the relatively weak and ineffective party system that our democracy provides.  What do you think?  Make use of the readings (perhaps including those from the week of February 24), the lectures, and class discussions, and do some research of your own as well.  Don't be afraid to argue (politely) with your classmates; let's see a strong and spirited discussion, backed by solid evidence!--NB

Thursday, February 6, 2014

Review for Exam #1

Hi, everyone!  Exam #1 is scheduled for Wednesday, February 12, in our regular classroom, during our regular class time.  You’ll have 75 minutes to complete the exam, though you probably won’t need that.  All you need to bring to the exam is a writing utensil (preferably a pen).  To prepare for the exam, you should make use of the readings, lectures, class discussions, and the blog assignment on ways around the free rider problem (including your colleagues’ comments).  If you want to ask me questions, there are three ways to do it:

1.        Email me at the address on the syllabus (berchnorto@msn.com).  I will generally respond quickly, but I may be slowed from about 10 am Friday to Monday evening (note again that there is no class on Monday, February 10, as I’ll be away on University business).  I hope to be able to respond, but that’s not totally guaranteed.  I will respond emailed questions until 1 pm on the day of the exam.

2.       You may post a question in the comments section of this blog post (this has been very effective in other classes).  However, I’m really unlikely to be able to answer them between 10 am Friday and Monday evening.  I’ll do what I can, but I’ll catch up on Monday night.  I will answer any questions posted on the blog before 11 am on the day of the exam (technical reasons for the earlier deadline).  I urge you to take a look at the comments on Wednesday before the exam, so you can take advantage of the questions asked by your colleaguges.

3.       I will have office hours on the day of the exam from 1:45 to 3:20.

The format of the exam is simple.  There will be two essay questions focusing on the formation and maintenance of interest groups, and you will need to answer both of them (probably in 1-3 pages each).  Here are general descriptions of the questions, though you should make sure to read the specific questions on the exam and answer them in all their parts:

1.       You will be asked to explain why not every interest forms an interest group.  You’ll want to take advantage of the notion of concentrated benefits and diffuse costs, the free rider problem, and Olson’s insights into why it is much easier for smaller, privileged groups (or even intermediate groups) to form, as opposed to larger, latent groups.

2.       You will be asked to explain why some large, latent groups manage to form and perhaps even maintain themselves over time despite the insight that Olson offers into the free rider problem.  You may be asked about specific groups.  You should be prepared to discuss the different kinds of selective incentives, conditional cooperation, federation, miscalculation of costs and benefits, low costs, political entrepeneurs, and altruism, as well as any other ideas you may have.

Good luck!--NB

Thursday, January 23, 2014

Solving the Free Rider Problem

This first blog assignment is worth 15 points (out of 100 blog points for the semester), and it is due at 3 pm on Wednesday, January 29.  Answers should probably be at least two paragraphs.  Better answers are thoughtful, address the comments of your colleagues (politely), and bring in other readings.

The free rider problem is key to understanding interest groups.  Some groups, often potentially large ones, fail to organize or to maintain themselves due to all potential members making the same calculation that their participation will not have an appreciable impact on the group's chances of success, that there are costs to participating, and that, if the group is successful, they will garner the benefits of the group's success whether they participated in its efforts or not.

Olson talks about this at length, focusing on the problems facing large, latent groups, and considering the possibilities for overcoming the free rider problem through the use of selective incentives of various sorts, which are only available to those who participate in the group's efforts.  He also considers the possibility of federation.

In class, in the game we played on Wednesday, we simulated the free rider problem.  While I'm not able to report precise results because a good number of you filled out the sheet incorrectly, I can report from class that scores (a measure of cooperation) rose from our initial single to trial to the first series of trials where we repeated the game 10 times (people learned and perhaps having a long-term relationship would make a difference).  That part of the experiment where we tried to see whether scores would rise if we paired people with other relationships outside of class failed, in part due to small numbers falling into that category.  We then tested whether scores would go up if we allowed opponents to talk before the game.  They did, as several pairs reached agreements to cooperate, offered conditional cooperation ("I'll cooperate as long as you do"), or otherwise strategized together (though several of these agreements broke down at the end of the game).  Finally, with the offer of extra credit on the line, cooperation declined in most cases, except for the one pairing where one opponent cooperated every time while their counterpart refused to cooperate, thus earning the latter a perfect score and the extra credit.

Finally, I'd like you to take a look at an article by British Professor Karina Whitehead, who argues that while conditional cooperation is a factor, there are several more mundane explanations for why people overcome the free rider problem all the time.  Her article can be found at https://winster.nottingham.ac.uk/cedex/documents/papers/2006-03.pdf 

Given all of this and our discussion in class, why do you think that some large groups are able to overcome the free rider problem and others are not?  Be specific, give examples (you may want to consider the case of SALA from last week), and make certain to indicate what you think of Olson's theory and Whitehead's ideas as well.  Good luck!--NB