This first blog assignment is worth 15 points (out of 100 blog points for the semester), and it is due at 3 pm on Wednesday, January 29. Answers should probably be at least two paragraphs. Better answers are thoughtful, address the comments of your colleagues (politely), and bring in other readings.
The free rider problem is key to understanding interest groups. Some groups, often potentially large ones, fail to organize or to maintain themselves due to all potential members making the same calculation that their participation will not have an appreciable impact on the group's chances of success, that there are costs to participating, and that, if the group is successful, they will garner the benefits of the group's success whether they participated in its efforts or not.
Olson talks about this at length, focusing on the problems facing large, latent groups, and considering the possibilities for overcoming the free rider problem through the use of selective incentives of various sorts, which are only available to those who participate in the group's efforts. He also considers the possibility of federation.
In class, in the game we played on Wednesday, we simulated the free rider problem. While I'm not able to report precise results because a good number of you filled out the sheet incorrectly, I can report from class that scores (a measure of cooperation) rose from our initial single to trial to the first series of trials where we repeated the game 10 times (people learned and perhaps having a long-term relationship would make a difference). That part of the experiment where we tried to see whether scores would rise if we paired people with other relationships outside of class failed, in part due to small numbers falling into that category. We then tested whether scores would go up if we allowed opponents to talk before the game. They did, as several pairs reached agreements to cooperate, offered conditional cooperation ("I'll cooperate as long as you do"), or otherwise strategized together (though several of these agreements broke down at the end of the game). Finally, with the offer of extra credit on the line, cooperation declined in most cases, except for the one pairing where one opponent cooperated every time while their counterpart refused to cooperate, thus earning the latter a perfect score and the extra credit.
Finally, I'd like you to take a look at an article by British Professor Karina Whitehead, who argues that while conditional cooperation is a factor, there are several more mundane explanations for why people overcome the free rider problem all the time. Her article can be found at https://winster.nottingham.ac.uk/cedex/documents/papers/2006-03.pdf
Given all of this and our discussion in class, why do you think that some large groups are able to overcome the free rider problem and others are not? Be specific, give examples (you may want to consider the case of SALA from last week), and make certain to indicate what you think of Olson's theory and Whitehead's ideas as well. Good luck!--NB
