This first blog assignment is worth 15 points (out of 100 blog points for the semester), and it is due at 3 pm on Wednesday, January 29. Answers should probably be at least two paragraphs. Better answers are thoughtful, address the comments of your colleagues (politely), and bring in other readings.
The free rider problem is key to understanding interest groups. Some groups, often potentially large ones, fail to organize or to maintain themselves due to all potential members making the same calculation that their participation will not have an appreciable impact on the group's chances of success, that there are costs to participating, and that, if the group is successful, they will garner the benefits of the group's success whether they participated in its efforts or not.
Olson talks about this at length, focusing on the problems facing large, latent groups, and considering the possibilities for overcoming the free rider problem through the use of selective incentives of various sorts, which are only available to those who participate in the group's efforts. He also considers the possibility of federation.
In class, in the game we played on Wednesday, we simulated the free rider problem. While I'm not able to report precise results because a good number of you filled out the sheet incorrectly, I can report from class that scores (a measure of cooperation) rose from our initial single to trial to the first series of trials where we repeated the game 10 times (people learned and perhaps having a long-term relationship would make a difference). That part of the experiment where we tried to see whether scores would rise if we paired people with other relationships outside of class failed, in part due to small numbers falling into that category. We then tested whether scores would go up if we allowed opponents to talk before the game. They did, as several pairs reached agreements to cooperate, offered conditional cooperation ("I'll cooperate as long as you do"), or otherwise strategized together (though several of these agreements broke down at the end of the game). Finally, with the offer of extra credit on the line, cooperation declined in most cases, except for the one pairing where one opponent cooperated every time while their counterpart refused to cooperate, thus earning the latter a perfect score and the extra credit.
Finally, I'd like you to take a look at an article by British Professor Karina Whitehead, who argues that while conditional cooperation is a factor, there are several more mundane explanations for why people overcome the free rider problem all the time. Her article can be found at https://winster.nottingham.ac.uk/cedex/documents/papers/2006-03.pdf
Given all of this and our discussion in class, why do you think that some large groups are able to overcome the free rider problem and others are not? Be specific, give examples (you may want to consider the case of SALA from last week), and make certain to indicate what you think of Olson's theory and Whitehead's ideas as well. Good luck!--NB
As we discussed in class, one of the biggest ways large groups are able to overcome the free rider problem is by the use of selective incentives, or offering incentives that are available only to those that participate in the interest group. An example of this, as given by Olson in the text, is American Automobile Association (AAA). AAA claims 54,000,000 members, many of which are enticed to join by the many benefits offered by AAA (i.e. Roadside Assistance, Battery Assistance, etc.)[1]. An example offered in class is AARP, which claims 38,000,000 members, and also offers a number of incentives[2]. While SALA is an example of an interest group that is local and could be relevant, I hesitate to say that it has overcome the free-rider problem given that it is still organizing it’s first large event.
ReplyDeleteOne of Olson’s suggestions was that groups are kept small to help to organize special interests, at least to begin. Doing so allows for the member’s to monitor each other’s participation to help prevent any free-riding. This also brings overlapping activities into effect, allowing for implementation of social sanctions against anyone that free rides. These smaller groups are then able to federate later, forming large groups that can have large power. Labor unions are the example Olson provides of this.
One of the major ways Whitehead suggests of avoiding the free-rider problem is the idea of “conditional cooperators.” What this means is that someone will cooperate with the rest of the group if the rest of the group cooperates. Should the others in the group free-ride, the conditional cooperator will provide less cooperation. Whitehead provides a number of experiments and real world evidence to back up this. In one of the experiments, those that were ranked as the most likely to conditionally cooperate were put in a group. Over a series of experiments, they consistently had the highest level of cooperation and therefore the best outcome for all. An interesting find of this study is that when a group of free-riders are put together, they are likely to begin contributing to the outcome. This suggests that as a whole, we would be best off if we could form groups based around the likelihood to contribute. In practice however, this is likely near impossible.
[1] http://newsroom.aaa.com/about-aaa/aaa-fact-sheet-2/
[2] http://www.aarp.org/about-aarp/press-center/info-2007/rx_bargaining_power.html
Zevi Lowenberg
ReplyDeleteThe Free Rider problem is one that each and every new group has to face, and overcome, if they want to be successful in the long run. Every group we are a part of, from clubs and sports teams, to political and lobbying groups, all have had to overcome the free rider problem at least once. There are also many groups no one has ever heard of because they were unsuccessful in overcoming the free rider problem.
I think that as we saw during the in class example, one of the main issues and roadblocks is that even if you have the people, there needs to be cooperation. A person’s word is simply that- words. You cannot start a successful and long-term group on a verbal agreement, because as we saw, eventually, most people are going to try and screw with that agreement and take control. Potential members have no interest in joining a group that has turmoil within the people running it, as they may feel like their time will be wasted dealing with that and not the actual issue. They may let other people deal with it, and if that mentality is held by everyone, the group crumbles. Secondly, as Olson points out, the larger the group gets, the fewer incentives there are for the individual. In a small group, each person is able to gain more per person, because there is the same amount of supply, but less demand. As the group grows, the supply stays the same, but the demand increases. If the members don’t like giving up part of their share, they leave, and if it becomes a mass exodus, the group crumbles. I agree that if I am receiving all these rewards for being one of only a few people in an organization, and then all of a sudden it starts growing, unless I benefit directly from the growth of the organization, the loss of incentives to be a member would make me think twice about remaining with the organization. College students are incredibly busy, and giving up time for an organization either means they are really passionate about the issue or group, or there are great incentives to joining and giving up whatever free time they may have. If you were to take away the incentives, all of a sudden, those people would more than likely leave unless they have a real connection and weren’t there simply for their own personal gain.
Those selective incentives are only available to the people that participate, but that is not always the case. As we saw in the example with SALA, or if we look at another, already established group on campus, the Mountaineer Maniacs, the incentives are not only for those that participate. If SALA wins their fight, and tuition stays the same, then all students benefit, not just those in SALA. Therefore, students may not be inclined to participate, letting someone else do the work for them, and introducing the free rider problem. The Maniacs face the same issues, though because they are already established and the largest student organization on campus, they have overcome the free rider problem. They offer membership plans for a fee, that if bought, you are guaranteed football tickets. However, even if you don’t join, many students are still able to get into the games because of the low numbers of requests. Therefore, many students decide not to join and pay the Maniacs for tickets, because they will just be able to get tickets for free later on. If everyone felt this way and didn’t join, then the Maniacs would have to overcome the free rider problem again, and would have to find new ways to get students to join the group.
Going back to the in-class example, we saw many examples of what Whitehead calls “conditional cooperators.” The partners agreed that they would both show the same side of the coin, or they would do whatever their partner did on the last turn, and that held up for many people. But, as soon as one person decided to mess with their partner and free ride because it was better for them, the agreement was off and the “interest group” crumbled.
I'd like to elaborate on something you said about the Maniacs. While I do agree with you that they don't have to worry about crumbling as an organization because of their large membership number, I actually don't think they would struggle to get members if for some reason more people decided to not buy the membership that gets you guaranteed football tickets (which, by the way, is a limited amount already). The reason I say this is because they already offer other incentives to joining their group aside from the football tickets, like watch parties, the opportunity to go on away game trips, giveaways, a discount at the bookstore, etc. Plus, the fact that some people do purchase the lower-level membership by choice shows that there is still enough interest in it. So while I do think there is the potential that they would have to worry about the free-rider problem, the likelihood of it happening is very slim, at least to me. Plus, for WVU, no one knows if the football team is going to be good/bad at the start of the season, so I would argue that it is worth buying at least one of the memberships because even if you could get football tickets for free because the team is terrible, you're still going to have other opportunities that could outweigh that.
DeleteI would think that SALA would want to have a similar approach that focuses on members-only. It doesn't even have to be related to their cause either. They could just have some other incentive that would basically make the trip to Charleston worth it no matter what the outcome was. I believe we mentioned this idea in class, and it would likely be smart. That's how the Maniacs do it, and they seem to be pretty successful. However, I think it would be in SALA's interest if they remained somewhat small; in other words, they shouldn't offer this incredibly large incentive for joining just to have quantity, because in this situation, they would probably rather have quality over quantity especially since their issue is precise, and they don't need someone uneducated on the subject making a fool of themselves.
Finally, regarding what the article touched on, I think cooperation in most circumstances is something that can't be predicted or measured. For the in-class example we had, it could be possible that some people failed to cooperate because they didn't care about what was going on or just wanted to screw with their friend. Others however may cooperate because they care about the assignment or are just plain honest. I would agree that voluntary cooperation is very fragile, although I would probably use a different choice of words and say something like unpredictable.
The free rider problem is one that all interests must face when forming their group. This problem is the first test the group will face could make or break them. In Olson reading he describes three different types of groups and their abilities to overcome this problem. The first group mentioned by Olson is the intermediate group. Intermediate groups are small but everyone has a large steak in the cause. This group faces the free rider problem but overcomes it quite successfully. Because of its small size, members in intermediate groups feel they have a large contribution to the cause giving them selective incentives to participate. The second group mentioned were latent groups. Latent groups are large groups with the members have little individual steak in the cause. These groups find the free rider problem an extremely difficult obstacle to overcome. The final group is a privileged group. This group consists of several members gaining more from public goods than it would cost them to provide it unilaterally. Privileged groups have a difficult time overcoming the free rider problem, but latent groups are less likely to overcome this problem and the intermediate groups are most likely to overcome it. So the main point is for the most part, the larger the group the harder it is to over come the free rider problem. Olson gives three reasons why this is. The reasons are: each group member has a lower share of the benefits, its less likely anybodies benefits of helping provide the good exceed the costs, and organizational costs rise with group size.
ReplyDeleteWhitehead focuses on the idea of conditional cooperation. This means that group members will only participate if the other group members are participating. For example, in class we used the example of the increase in tuition. Disgruntled students would form a group against tuition increases and go down to Charleston to protest. The conditional cooperation that Whitehead describes could make or break this protest. If you can get a lot of people to successfully cooperate and go then you will have the whole group there but the lack of cooperation from a few members could cause a majority of the group not to cooperate and not go. So conditional cooperation when forming an interest group and overcoming the free rider problem is crucial.
As I talked about earlier, larger groups have a very difficult time overcoming the free rider problem. One reason why this happens is because conditional cooperation can be extremely tough to deal with in these groups as Whitehead described. But conditional cooperation can work in favor of these groups and actually lead to overcoming the free rider problem. Another way groups overcome this problem is by the process of federation which we talked about in class. This process is when a large interest group divides itself into a series of smaller groups. Another way around the free rider problem is selective incentives. The three types of selective incentives we talked about in class are, economic, solitary, and expressive. In the case of the tuition increases, students may receive any of these incentives for participating in the protest in Charleston. Also if the students protesting in Charleston work with an already established and successful group like SALA or SGA then people will be more inclined to go because of their ties to those groups or because the movement looks more legitimate with those groups involved. Therefore, the free rider problem can be overcome in various ways.
Sean Weaver
It’s an issue most people don’t realize they face: The Free Rider Problem. Why go out of my way to participate if I’m better off staying out of the zero degree weather to march in Charleston?
ReplyDeleteLike Zevi mentioned, many groups go unnoticed because they were unsuccessful in overcoming the free rider problem.
In class we discussed some of the ways to get around it…
Offer incentives
Smaller groups can easily monitor each other’s participation
Apply social sanctions against free riders
Use taxes and fines
Make participation easy
Olson talks about three different types of groups:
Intermediate groups- small, but everyone has a large stake (members feel like they big contribution so they participate)
Latent groups- larger, participants have less responsibility. More free rider issues.
Privileged groups- A few members gain more from public goods that it costs them to provide it
Basically, larger groups tend to have more participation issues because each member has a smaller share, its less likely any one person’s participation exceed the costs (Think of the SALA example…One person is better off never going down to Charleston even if we do win lower tuition) and its harder to organize.
I think Olson has the right idea to keep groups smaller, at least at first, to keep it easier to observe participants. Those smaller groups can join together later (think labor unions). I also like Whitehead’s idea of “conditional cooperators” (someone will cooperate if the rest of the group cooperates). Some groups are able to overcome the free rider problem by using their ideas.
The best way to combat low participation is to use smaller groups and then maybe combined with others later. Offer incentives and impose social sanctions to free riders. Kick them out of the group or fine them. I hate to use it as an example, but Frats have high participation rates because they use social sanctions.
Michael Quillen
ReplyDeleteEach individual interest group is faced with their own set of challenges and obstacles they must overcome before any initiative is taken, regardless of the capacity and nature of the group. With that being said, one of the main concerns for all groups is ‘how to overcome to the free rider problem’. For some groups—mainly smaller one’s—the struggle is increasingly difficult given their size and resources. Olson pointed out that there are three different types of interest groups facing the government today. First group being the intermediate group—the small-in-size organization that holds an enormous steak in the cause. Overcoming the free rider problem doesn’t quite seem to be a problem considering a vast majority of its members feel as though they personally contribute a large portion to the mission. Given this, Olson introduces the second type of interest group called latent groups. Which are the exact opposite of the intermediate groups. There are much more people in them classifying them as a ‘large’ interest group, while stakeholders seem to feel their individual effort is not worth the overall outcome. As a result, latent groups find themselves desperately trying to overcome the free rider problem because no one seems to feel the need to contribute anything. The last group Olson mentions is the privileged group. Most of the members classified in this category tend to feel the public good outweighs their own personal cost of contributing to the group. Making the free rider problem nearly impossible to overcome.
One thing that was mentioned was this idea of selective incentives. There are three types of selective incentives groups out there: economic, expressive, and solitary. While they appear to be given to everyone within the group, it is not always the situation. A perfect example of this is what we discussed in class pertaining to SALA. If members fight the battle and win, tuition remains the same, making everyone—not only the members of the group—beneficiaries of the deal. Which is why some students do not feel obligated to contribute because they know others will act in their place in order to see tuition decrease. If students feel obligated to join a group, this will only add to the overall success, making it stronger to compete with.
Stemming off of this, Whitehead gears her argument towards why “conditional cooperation” is overwhelmingly difficult to deal with in larger groups. In an effort to uncover why this may be true, Whitehead argues that “a free rider who believes others contribute zero and actually contributes nothing him-or-herself is observationally equivalent to a pessimistic conditional cooperator who only contributes little because he or she believes that others with free ride.” Her point being that members that contribute little to nothing at all ultimately resemble those types of members that free ride the system. To sum up, the amount of cooperation a member contributes solely relies on how he or she feels everyone else is contributing making the free rider problem an extremely worrisome dilemma for most interest groups.
The biggest issue with forming and joining large interest groups is the free-rider problem. In other words, members who join the group solely to reap the benefits of the group but are not engaged in the groups activities which are trying to embetter the group which in turn will result in the groups individual members reaping the benefits of the group. Their are several factors that decide why some groups are able to overcome the free-rider problem and while others cannot. The first way a group can over come the free-rider problem is by keeping the group smaller in number of individuals as Olson states, "The larger the group is, the farther it will fall short of obtaining an optimal supply of any collective good"(Olson 36). What is being said here is that in smaller groups people feel that their contributions matter and that group members have an easier time of monitoring other group members. This strategy could help curtail the free-rider problem to an extent. Another way in which some groups overcome the free-rider problem is by a federation. In this example a large group can be broken down into smaller groups. These smaller groups would have overlapping activities and would have common interests. In this example it reveals that it is easier to monitor group members, and that it would keep more people active in the group.
ReplyDeleteTheir is another set of ways in which large groups can overcome the free-rider problem and this would be by selective incentives. As Olson says "Social Sanctions and social rewards are 'selective incentives'; that is, they are among the kinds of incentives that may be used to mobilize a latent group"(Olson 61). The first of the incentives is the economic incentives. As we discussed in class AARP has many economic incentives, for example the discount at Denny's that we discussed in class. Another type of incentive is the solidarity incentive. Here, people would join the group for the social interaction that results in being a part of a large group. And by social interaction, I mean being engaged in group activities that will result as the groups seeks benefits for its members. The last of the incentives is the expressive incentive. The expressive incentive is the benefit you receive for taking a stand on something that you believe in. Incorporating these three incentives into a large group can vastly increase the chances of the given group overcoming the free-rider problem. According to professor Whitehead, their are several other factors as to why people overcome this problem. One is group composition, here it is important to accept like-minded individuals in the group to maximize potential and efficiency. Another is work morale. In this theory people adapt work morale to that of their peers, and according to Whitehead their is empirical evidence that shows this is correct. Although the free-rider problem is a major issue for many groups, it is a problem that can be overcome.
As mentioned in class, in our reading by Olson, and in previous posts by my classmates, the free rider problem is a hassle for all up and coming interest groups. Olson discusses the three types of selective incentives that help in overcoming this problem, as mentioned above, which are economic, solitary, and expressive incentives. It seems to me that the most effective type of incentive to build an interest group around would be the expressive incentive. Giving members the opportunity to take a stand on an issue they believe in and feel good about being a member, cuts down on the costs to run such an interest group because the interest group doesn't have to provide anything extra for its members or supporters, while the members, in large, feel personally obligated to offer time and money to the group. Groups that offer this incentive and interest groups such as the NRA and, especially, PETA, pull at the belief systems of their supporters. While you don't necessarily need to be a member to see the benefits of what they accomplish, the expressive incentive is overwhelming.
ReplyDeleteThis sense of obligation most certainly cuts down on what Whitehead refers to as Conditional Cooperation. This is because supporters don't support these groups based on other people's actions, but their own beliefs. I do think, however, that this conditional cooperation is going to be the biggest obstacle for WVU SALA to overcome if they even stand a chance at overcoming the free rider problem. While hooking up with established groups like SGA and gaining exposure through the university newspaper gets SALA positive attention, the incentives of joining SALA seem to only be hypothetical at this time. That is, the incentives will only come if the group can overcome the free rider problem and gain enough supporters to actually have an effect.
In my opinion, the only way for SALA to completely overcome the free rider problem would be to restate their purpose to include an expressive incentive, while continuing to pursue the goal of keeping tuition costs low. This sense of obligation by WVU students would make them more willing to face the costs of attending different types of activism, such as a trip to Charleston. It would also help eliminate the need for monitoring group members, as cooperation would not be conditional, but personal, and members would participate instead of taking the free ride. Expressive incentives exploit the supporters' belief system in a way that allows them to make the irrational decision not to free ride, but to participate.
JT Pittman
The free-rider problem is an issue that all interest groups face, and if not resolved properly, could very well be the death of the interest group as a whole. If there is not enough reason for members to join and/or stay up to date with participation and their roles in the group's motive, the group's numbers are extremely likely to decline very quickly. One possible solution we discussed in class is for groups to provide incentives for membership as well as participation. Some basic examples of this happening can be found in groups like the AARP, the NRA, or even AAA. All of these groups get you discounts at various businesses across the country. Still, this just raises groups numbers, and enables the free rider problem. Not every group can expect to be as successful as these three while experiencing so many freeloaders.
ReplyDeleteOlson's suggestions about keeping interest groups on the smaller side intrigue me. While sensible, it also seems that certain groups (i.e. AAA, NRA, AARP) do better with their power in numbers and threats to get their members to do certain things if their agendas are not met. However, in terms of participation, feeling like you make an impact, and getting a say in things, smaller groups are still always going to be more productive. As Andrew pointed out, Olson said "The larger the group is, the farther it will fall short of obtaining an optimal supply of any collective good" in regards to one capital difference between large groups and smaller sized groups. This is true, but again, it feels like there are more groups that are extremely large in size making impacts in the United States today than there are smaller groups.
Whitehead's theory made much more sense to me. He laid out an idea for interest groups where one person works with others and the higher the cooperation and participation from the group, the more the person will cooperate with the group's wishes. I felt like this is similar to how a group like the NRA works. You can join, reap the benefits of being a member, but if you ultimately are a free-rider, your exact goals will never be followed. Perhaps you think the NRA should take a less aggressive stance on certain legislation, but if you freeride, how would this ever occur? This theory from Whitehead allows groups to grow in size to monumental numbers, while members still feel like they are participating, and can even see a direct impact sometimes.
Chris Cocuzza
As my fellow students and Olson have made clear, the free-rider problem is a significant issue that all interest groups face. While Olson proves to us that small groups can typically overcome this free rider problem without offering any outside incentives because they are able to monitor individuals, large groups cannot. With a large amount of people, the free-rider is able to slack because his small loss will most likely not destroy the group effort nor will the other group members be able to effectively monitor whether he contributes or not. To combat these issues, Olson offers up solutions to large, latent interest groups. Selective incentives are given to only those members which contribute. Economic, which I believe to have the biggest impact, is money based. Using the example given in class, a very large interest group, AARP, uses economic incentives by giving discounts for many restaurants and events. I have yet to encounter a person that does not love a discount, so this is why I believe it to be the most effective. While I am sure this is a big reason AARP has been able to overcome the free rider problem, its extremely large size gives it the means. Some groups may not be able to use this incentive to overcome the free rider problem because they may not have the funds to offer a great deal of monetary incentive. Solitary incentives involve social interaction; humans are by nature social beings and we like to interact with like-minded people. While I do believe this would work in a case like SALA where all members would be students, I do not believe this incentive works in all cases. Going back to AARP, I do not think that group would benefit from their collective sense of oldness. While AARP is covered with their economic incentives, I don't believe they or similar organizations would overcome the free rider problem using solitary incentives alone. Expressive incentives involve the moral satisfaction of the member in taking a stand for a movement they believe in. I believe this is very effective for SALA at the start, but as we discussed in class, our fiery feelings over certain issues can deteriorate with time. Along with these selective incentives, Olson offers us a look at federation, which boils down to turning a latent, large group into a series of small groups. In class, we talked about the example of fraternities and sororities. As a population, it would be impossible to monitor whether or not a WVU student participated in a movement designed to benefit all students. However, with federation, it becomes easier to log who has not participated.
ReplyDeleteConditional cooperation is talked about by Whitehead. Conditional cooperation involves cooperating only when you think someone will cooperate with you. We saw this happen in the game we played in class, though most groups that tried this encountered the last period problem where no incentive remains because the game was about to end. However, interest groups typically do not have a known ending point so they are able to potentially circumvent the issue we encountered in class. Whitehead says that our beliefs coincide with our cooperation. If we have a high belief that someone will cooperate and keep cooperating, we are more inclined to continue working with them. However, if we believe that they will free ride, we will not cooperate with them. I agree with this and find that most rational humans would follow this concept. She continued to say that we aggregate our beliefs with others so this could cause this theory to falter.
Given all this information, I believe that some large groups overcome the free rider problem while others do not because of whether or not their selective incentives are prominent and good enough to keep people involved. While I believe that the other incentives do play a role in keeping away free riders, money does make most people's proverbial worlds go 'round, and they would be more motivated by monetary incentives than anything to keep their cooperation with the interest group at an all time high.
India Ross
Overcoming the free rider problem is a challenge that faces many groups who attempt to form in the hopes of accomplishing some goal. While a difficult task, it is not impossible to surmount the odds, as can be seen by the number of interest groups we see in the United States. Mancur Olson and Whitehead both provide several ways that large groups can form despite the fact that rationally thinking people would not join; in addition, as discussed in class, we have groups close to home that have overcome the same problem, and we can glean some knowledge from observing the functions of these groups.
ReplyDeleteTo begin, Olson explains that the size of a group can have significant impact on a group’s ability to overcome the free rider problem, and goes on to classify them into three types of groups. The most important type of group to look at is Intermediate Groups, as they have the least amount of trouble overcoming these problems, and we can gain the most insight from them. Olson says this is due to their small size, which leads all members of the group to believe they are contributing to decisions, making them less likely to not participate in group decisions due to the selective incentives that they will enjoy.
Whitehead suggests a different method of avoiding this dilemma, one of conditional cooperation. Conditional cooperation basically stipulates that a person will cooperate with the interests of a group based on the assumption that the other members of the group will do the same. As Professor Berch demonstrated in class when we played the game with the coins, the concept works up until a certain point; until there are no benefits provided for cooperation. This makes it an ideal concept, more easily envisioned than put into action.
As far as our home-grown groups here in Morgantown go, SALA has overcome this problem in some ways, but not others. They have overcome the problem in the sense that they have made the ability to join their group accessible to everyone (Joining is only a click away on Facebook), but they still face the problem when it comes to getting members to participate in group actions. They applied the concept of low costs to joining to make joining seem worth it, and could they apply this concept to member participation in other areas, I feel they would be quite successful.
Overall, I think that a combination of all the ideas presented by all of these sources is needed to effectively undertake the task of defeating the free rider problem. Conditional cooperation, small group size, selective incentives, and low contribution costs all are key factors in a group’s ability to overcome the free rider problem.
-Eric Johnston
The Free Rider Problem: it's a challenge that every interest or lobbying group will have to face, whether they want to admit it or not. A lot of my fellow classmates, such as Zevi and Michael, have made some really good points. So many groups fail at overcoming the Free rider problem and thus the public has never heard of them.
ReplyDeleteAlso, like stated by some people above, numbers alone won't be enough to overcome or defeat the Free ride problem. For example, Olson talks about three different types of groups that mirror that observation pretty well. The three types are: The intermediate groups, the latent groups and the privileged groups.
An Intermediate group is smaller in size, but all of its members have a large stake and feel like they could contribute something by participating. It’s not as hard for them to overcome the Free rider problem. Then there are the Latent groups, which are much larger. The members of this group might feel like their individual effort or participation may not effect or impact the group effort as a whole. Unlike, the Intermediate groups, these larger Latent groups will have a tougher time overcoming the Free Rider problem because of participation issues. Numerically, these Latent groups may have the numbers needed to make an impact, but it will be harder to get out and about to support the cause. Finally, there are the Privileged groups, which are a small group of people, most likely only a handful of members, who would benefit more from public goods then paying for the cost themselves. These groups would also have an issue getting past the Free ride problem. However, in the end, the Latent group will struggle the most, while the intermediate groups would struggle the least.
That brings up an important topic, one that Olson talked about specifically: Selective incentives. Now, while the Free rider problem is a very real and serious one, there are ways of tackling it. The use of selective incentives is just one way of doing that. There are three main selective incentives: Economic, Expressive, and Solidary.
With economic benefits, you could see people join because they believe their activism will be rewarded with discounts and the like. However, you could also see people just join for the benefits and not do anything; this is especially true for latent groups such as the AARP. Then, with solidary benefits, groups can benefit from people who loving being a part of something they consider special – an organization with liked minded thinkers. This seems like it works very well in intermediate or smaller groups, where everyone knows each other. However, in larger groups this might actually be another obstacle that might contribute to the Free rider problem. I think the Mountaineer Maniacs are a good example for solidary benefits. I have friends who just love being with other people who share the same passion for sports as they do. They travel around the country, hold tailgates for students who may not even be that active in the organization. Finally, there is also the Expressive incentive, which is when a person is emotionally charged on an issue, or is motivated “to take a firm stand” on an issue. This could be really beneficial for a large organization. However, like we discussed in class, eventually people will find other issues to get emotionally charged over. Emotion is a good short term tool but not a good one long term.
With all of this in mind, there is another concept that we can have a conversation about. That concept is Conditional cooperation. This concept brought up by Professor Whitehead is definitely an interesting one: If you can get people to cooperate, then you are set and can plan to set your goals. However, if you can’t, then it’s just another glaring challenge for interest groups, especially large ones.
I have come to the conclusion that having smaller groups in most cases, at least in the beginning, would be beneficial in the fight against the Free Rider problem. It gives them an opportunity to monitor their membership from the very beginning.
- David Leviev
The free rider problem is felt more in large groups compared to small groups. Large groups can over come the free rider problem in multiple ways. In my opinion, interest groups that practice federation may conquer free rider with more ease. By creating sub divisions, or chapters, interest groups can monitor membership participation. Monitoring participation is very important it can influence conditional cooperation. As the article noted, by maintaining a small size participants are more likely to participate because they see other people participating. Being “partners” or friends are more likely to contribute when compared to “strangers”. Federation helps this factor, although it was not reflected in our class scenario. However, the article also states that this effect can deplete over time. By keeping the group “tight knit” members can anticipate what other will do, thus contributing more and contributing to conditional cooperation. Social interaction also draws people into interest groups. Self satisfaction undoubtedly proves to be an initially adequate reward for participation. However, the most prominent reason free rider ruins interest groups is the group composition. Like in small factions of groups at large, members notice their peers‘ actions or in this case, lack of. If everyone in the group, regardless of size assumes that everyone will free ride, the group is unlikely to succeed. Additionally, selective incentives are a major way to over come the free rider problem. AARP is an example used time and time again. AARP members receive discounts, thus a selective incentive. From my observations, SALA may see a larger turnout if they offer a selective benefit, such as a SALA exclusive party or transportation to Charelston. Furthermore, SALA may experience greater participation because many people may know each other and will participate based on others’ actions. Based on the above, I believe a combination of Olson and Whitehead’s theories are key to success for interest groups.
ReplyDelete-Megan Hobbs
The theory stands that individual interests must triumph over the infamous free-rider problem in order to form (and remain) even a moderately successful group. According to Olson, small privileged group members will feel as if their contributions are worthwhile to the betterment of the cause and peer members can monitor fellow members in many cases therefore, these groups have the upper hand in the fight against the free rider problem. However, many times, larger groups are not so lucky. Especially due to the fact they are more prone to conditional cooperation "I'll go if you go". To heavily paraphrase and summarize Whitehead's description of this seems to be members weighing the "is the juice worth the squeeze" theory or "Why work to receive the same outcome if I don't work?". As for the solution to this problem there is no solidified, set in stone remedy, but various methods large (latent) groups may utilize in order to overcome it. As mentioned earlier, keeping member population low, especially in the early stages, is the most effective way to battle the free rider problem. The dairy farmer example from class is a great explanation as to why this method is so effective. However, this is a relatively small interest when compared to other interest groups across the nation. One way these larger interests could solve the issue of size is through the federation concept (or turn larger groups into groups of smaller groups). Also, overlapping interests in addition to federation would help members monitor others therefore helping avoid the free rider problem.
ReplyDeleteThere are various other methods which many groups use in order to battle the free rider problem. Selective incentives are a prime example. In class and in the reading we find three different types of selective incentives that groups often use to their benefit. First there is economic incentives, which can come from outsiders or political entrepreneurs who attempt to put their fingerprints on the interest to potentially help them later on. In class we used the example of AARP and their notorious knack for deal making with all types of business (Denny's). These incentives can be effective in that they are only offered to those who join the group. Economic incentives are also beneficial in that they could be used to ease the worries of out of pocket expenses of members (a free bus trip to Charleston to march on the Capital building with a free party afterwards). The next incentive mentioned was dealing more with the social aspect to attract members. Solidary incentives basically mean "the things you get" in that it makes people feel good to be in the presence of those who share similar interest if not just one. Finally, expressive incentives, or the good feeling one gets for standing up for what he/she believes in. An example of this would be civil rights. However, it's hard to sustain interests on expressive incentives alone. This is due to the fact interests, like almost everything else are not static and will change/evolve with time. In the end these are a handful of tools and methods perspective, large groups may utilize in their fight against the free rider problem. Interests who use them effectively could have a fighting chance in the battle. However, I feel many times it also depends on the sustainability and influence of the interest itself that could play a key role on the groups survival in the long run.
While many large, latent groups struggle with the free rider problems, others have overcame the problem through various resolutions. Olson talks extensively of large labor unions as groups that have overcome the free rider problem. The largest factor in labor unions overcoming the free rider problem is compulsory membership and federations of small labor unions. By forcing workers in a certain industry to join unions they solve the free rider problem because essentially no one is a free rider but rather they are fee-paying members of the group. Though once they are members, participation is, at best, minimal. Rarely do they have substantial participation in union meetings or even sufficient enthusiasm to fulfill local chapter leadership roles. Large labor unions could not and would not exist if it were not for compulsory membership.
ReplyDeleteAnother way that large groups overcome the free rider problem is economic incentives that are available for only members of the group. AARP is an example of this. Members who pay their fees are given discounts to hotels, rental cars, and pharmaceutical prescriptions. The number of members in AARP would not be as large if it were not for these economic incentives. The work of all members of the AARP are not available to all retired persons.
SALA is an example of what Whitehead calls conditional cooperation. For SALA to overcome the free rider problem they need to make those not involved feel that everyone else is on board with their "program". Whitehead claims that free riders free ride because that what is he/she feels that others are doing. This may be an uphill battle for SALA because many students at WVU may feel that everyone else is free riding and it is okay if they did the same. Since SALA is a small group it is possible for them to police their own ranks and see who is an active participant and those who are not. But as Olson points out, smaller groups do have a higher success rate at solving the free rider problem.
Large groups will use selective incentives to get over the free rider problem. They use these incentives so people actually join and participate in the group. For example, the AARP use incentives to get people to join their group. When the selective incentive is economical it gives benefits to the people who join the group. Then you have the solidary incentive were people join for social interaction. So you get more people coming to meetings and participating in the group. The final incentive is the expressive and it is the benefit that you get for standing up for something you believe in. People join these groups for these incentives and the people who are in it for the solidary and expressive incentives will participate more because it makes them feel good. Olson says that large groups are latent groups because they have a latent power or capacity for action, but that potential power can be realized or mobilized only with the aid of selective incentives. So it all comes back to having those selective incentives. Without these incentives groups may not be able to overcome the free rider problem. Some groups that do not overcome the pree rider problem are groups without incentives to join. If I do not have an incentive to join a group then I am not going to waste my time by joining the group. But if I have an incentive then I would join. A good example of this is the SALA example from class. I do not really have an incentive to join them and go with them to Charleston to ask for low tuition because I will be graduating in May so it will not affect me. Large groups can also overcome the free rider problem by having conditional cooperation.
ReplyDeleteI believe that some of Whitehead’s idea on the free rider problem is true. For instance the voluntary cooperation is fragile definition. Some people will volunteer but the free riders will not and that’s when the problems begin. When people start cooperating and work something out only then will they overcome the free rider problem.
William Keefer
Robert Ralston (1)
ReplyDeleteAs has been stated variously above by our colleagues, the free rider problem is both the most prevalent problem facing group membership and the most difficult to remedy. It can be defined as the failure of a rational individual to have incentive to provide for a public good, that is, a good which is enjoyed by an entire group, despite that she would be better off if it was provided for. Olson explains this by comparing rational individuals with firms in a perfectly competitive market. Though it would be advantageous for every firm to slow production and raise prices, even one dissenting firm which failed to do so would claim either the full benefit or most of the benefit of the action. It is rational for every firm to try and be this dissenting firm and, therefore, the public good – higher prices – will never be provided for.
This problem is compounded for large groups, called “latent groups” in Olson’s taxonomy. In a sufficiently large group, the action or inaction of one individual is indistinguishable. This means that even social incentives – such as avoiding consequences for not taking part or being seen as an out-group member – have no effect on whether an individual contributes toward the collective good. Also, the larger the group, the lesser fraction of the public good is obtained by any individual who participates, lowering the incentives to be a member.
The most obvious remedy to this problem is the introduction of selective economic incentives, that is, economic incentives which are enjoyed by every in-group member and no out-group members. The point of these incentives would be to make membership rational even if no collective good is ever provided for. As Kyle pointed out, AARP is a great example of this, providing discounts to a variety of stores and restaurants in return for a small membership fee. This strategy has worked very well for the organization, as it has become “well over twice the size of the AFL-CIO and, after the Roman Catholic Church, [it] is the nation’s largest organization” according to “The Changing Nature of Interest Group Politics” by Loomis and Cigler. Another example of this is seen in the NRA. In yesterday’s editorial section of the New York Times, Joe Nocera published a series of emails sent by the NRA which included opportunities to enter a “BANNED GUNS RAFFLE”, discounted life insurance, cheap Christmas cards, and 72% off a Personal Defense Network premium membership.
A second remedy proposed by Olson is the “federation” of a large group. This involves splitting a large group into several smaller groups which report back to the main group in order to impose small group-like social incentives on members. These groups would be small enough that any member’s free riding would have a noticeable effect, but would still be working towards the larger goal. Professor Karina Whitehead also contributed to this, albeit indirectly, when she spoke of “social interaction effects in volunteer cooperation”. In this regard, her basic idea was that the general cooperation of most members of a group will cause other members of the group to be more cooperative, while if most members free-ride, this will cause more free riders. Since a smaller-grouped federation in itself provides more incentive to cooperate, Whitehead’s principle will cause even less people to free ride when federated.
Robert Ralston (2)
ReplyDeleteWhile Olson focused mainly on economic incentives, Loomis and Ciglar, in the above-mentioned essay, detailed two other forms of selective incentives, solidarity and expressive incentives. Solidarity incentives are those achieved through friendship and good-times while contributing to a group. As a member of the Secular Student Alliance at WVU (SSA at WVU), I see members who come to meetings and functions merely for the companionship, and enjoy talking before, during, and afterwards with like-minded people. These are solidarity incentives in action. Expressive incentives, on the other hand are those which come from promoting an idea, ideology, or cause which one is passionate about. Using the same example, there are people who come to our meetings wishing only to talk about the promotion of secularism and to have side conversation as little as possible. These people are participating mostly out of expressive incentives.
While these are two distinct kinds of incentives, they can easily work in tandem as well. Consider the popular French Revolution saying, “Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité” or liberty, equality, fraternity[1].The first two words, liberty and equality, are expressing an expressive incentive to join. These are emotionally-charged ideas which everyone is passionate about. The third, fraternity, expresses the need for a solidarity incentive – the brotherhood of other people. It seems that combined incentives, such as these, are strong enough even to cause an entire revolution.
Finally, Whitehead speaks of conditional cooperation solving the free rider problem. This type of cooperation attempts to explain discord between the now traditional theories of voluntary action and recent empirical data. She ventures that most individuals are conditionally cooperative, that is, they cooperate when everyone else is cooperating. For example, it is not uncommon for an individual to go to meetings for a group while attendance and participation are high. However, if attendance or participation becomes low, they now become uncooperative.
In conclusion, the free rider problem is particularly tricky for large groups to handle. That being said, it can be overcome in several ways, including providing for selective economic incentives, federalizing, providing solidarity or expressive incentives, or encouraging collective cooperation.
References:
[1] http://www.france.fr/en/institutions-and-values/slogan-french-republic
Though smaller interest groups most often benefit in their small size and more easily overcome the free rider problem, it is not impossible for a large group to overcome the problem as well. But why do some large groups overcome it whereas others do not? There are many factors that play into this. In order to overcome the free rider problem, there needs to be either a government provider, an elite member in a privileged group (if you are lucky enough), or the offering of some type of incentive. People will not simply willingly join any group if they do not plan to gain from the experience. This can bring us to cases of solitary and expressive incentives. Indeed they play a role and can increase membership, but it is economic incentives that play the largest role. For example, one is more likely to join a group that will give a lucky winning member a $200 gift card to RadioShack than a group that does not offer that incentive. It also helps to have easy entry into the group. Using SALA as an example as an easy-entry group; all one has to do is click 'join' via Facebook. One is not as likely to join a group where they must drive to a location, fill out forms, and register as a member to become a part of that group. It can also be taken into consideration that a latent interest group can use federation to be more successful. With the group being divided up into smaller groups, it is easier to monitor members and hold them accountable for their actions.
ReplyDeleteI agree with Eric Johnston that SALA has overcome some, but not all of the free rider problem. They have SGA to back them up as well as an easy entry barrier, yet they lack a few things- such as stronger organization. As the Karina Whitehead article states, large interest groups are very fragile. I personally believe that to overcome the free rider problem in a larger interest group there needs to be all three types of incentives, organization, federation, a specific goal, and partnership with a government actor if at all possible. With all of these components present, I would have much confidence in the interest group- no matter the size. If SALA contained all of these components, I would feel encouraged to attend the march to Charleston, assured that my attendance would matter and impact the outcome of the march.
Interest groups are a unique and democratic factor of our American political system that many people join for a variety of reasons, whether it is for economic, social, patriotic or other reasons. They form in a variety of sizes, including the small, but very participatory Intermediate groups, and the large Latent groups, who often face many issues.
ReplyDeleteRegardless, all interest groups face the obstacles of overcoming the free rider problem. Rationally speaking, why would you miss work, pay $100 in gas travelling to Washington, and rally in subzero weather when you’ve only got a 50/50 shot of winning? Most wouldn’t – and this defines the free rider.
It is difficult for groups to overcome the free rider problem because, as Olsen discusses, most people are rational and self-interested (self-interest is also assumed to include those in the close family). Presumably, we will always make the decision that benefits us best, and often that leaves people with the conclusion that their participation is irrelevant or not as important in the long run.
Olsen proposes many different ways in which groups of all sizes can tackle the free rider issue. One is by using selective incentives, which comes in many subcategories. The first is economic, which will only benefit those who join the group. Olsen mentioned AAA, a great example of a business that offers incentive discounts that cover everything from car assistance to hotel discounts. The second is solidary incentives, which are non-monetary benefits you will gain from the experience, like friendship, or meeting your husband at the rally of your interest group. It fulfills our need to belong to something, and allows us to share interests with others like ourselves. The third is expressive incentives, which for many marks their patriotism, and fulfills a need or want to “take a stand.”
One specific example of a remedy for the free rider problem is through federation, which takes a large group and divides it into smaller ones, and can be very effective. In class, we used the example of a labor union in a small town or community. A division of a large labor union in this town, and roughly 100 people are expected to participate. It will become apparent who did not since the group is so small, and the town may ostracize those who did not participate. People will find this out through social groups and community activities, and look down on the non-participant for “going against” improvements. In a latent group, this would be nearly impossible to do since it is so large, and many members may be strangers to one another.
The free rider problem is tricky and will always be difficult to tackle, but can be overcome with many of these factors.
As a Women and Gender Studies major and proclaimed activist, it was difficult for me to conceptualize that the rational decision for an individual is, in fact, free-riding. In an ideal situation, an individual abstains from group participation, in hopes that the group still prospers on behalf of their interests without their personal investment, membership, or work. After reading both Olson’s and Whitehead’s texts, statistically calculating the pay-off of participation versus absenteeism, viewing the situation confronting student organization SALA, as well as performing our in class experiment, I’ve realized a major issue facing the formation of all interest groups is thus: the free rider problem.
ReplyDeleteWhile selective incentives to reward full participation are great for pulling in members, Whitehead argues that conditional cooperation is the make-or-break to the free-rider problem. She essentially questions the idea that if membership, participation, or action requires a motive of self-interest, then why do we see individuals dropping out in a chronological, chain-response? Why does the free-rider problem still exist when so many interest groups offer clear incentives? That is not enough. Conditional cooperators, those who require the social reinforcement to maintain voluntary cooperation, will be less affected by the incentives and more affected by the size and social structure of the interest group. This has interesting ramifications of the size of the interest group, because as a group transforms or succeeds, without enforcing the importance of member participation, the conditional cooperator may find themself lost in the crowd, out of touch with their rewards, punishments, purpose.
Similarly, college-aged student organizations are especially susceptible to this conditional cooperation. I project that this will be the issue that up-and-coming organization SALA has to face. An endeavor such as a march on Charleston, convincing the Mountaineer masses to participate in a vote for lower tuitions, will fall on deaf ears if not for the reinforcement and use of their parent group, SGA, or the outreach to fellow student communities. As Prof Berch interestingly suggested, if you were trying to organize this trip to Charleston, and you were to employ the 30,000 students of WVU, you’d end up with little to no results, whereas if you organize this trip to Charleston working through the 300 student organizations monitoring, punishing, rewarding, and reinforcing the purpose of the trip, you’d find a major difference in success rate.
In overcoming the free-rider problem, you must make incentives of self-interest apparent, but as both Olson and Whitehead suggest social sanctions are require for the continued membership and work of conditional cooperators.
Pablo Visedo
ReplyDeleteFirstly I would like to define free rider as those individuals or entities that consume more than their fair share of a resource inside a group, or not face a fair share of the cost of production. The free rider problem deals with how to keep people from being a stowaway, or at least limit its negative effects.
Marcur Olson talks about the behavior of interest groups and social movements. For starters, Olson set that the interest groups (including here trade unions) incite to free rider problem, so many of its members are actively involved in this kind of clusters to take advantage of the efforts of the others with whom they share interest and aspirations. Olson suggested that it is easier to mobilize collective action in small interest groups as large, due to in the large groups, it is necessary to mobilize a large number of workers if they want to get a social impact with your actions. So I think Olson has a good theory that to organize large groups it is better to keep groups smaller, at least at the beginning, and it will be easier to control the participation.
As we saw with SALA it is possible to overcome the free rider problem using different types of ideas as we exposed. A good example of the free rider problem is military spending: no person can be excluded from being defended by the military forces of a country, and therefore someone might refuse or avoid pay to be defended. Therefore it is common practice that governments do not finance using voluntary donations, but tax collectors and some countries perform compulsory military service.
The way to overcome the free rider problem in according with Whitehead´s idea through conditional cooperators, due to the voluntary cooperation has a lot of problems: people have “warm-glow” preferences, many people have altruistic preferences, people make mistakes…, so through conditional cooperators, people will cooperate with the other if the others cooperate too. In conclusion I think Whitehead´s theory is a good way to overcome the free rider problem.
Audra Phibbs
ReplyDeleteThe free rider problem is a common dilemma that many interest groups face. The root of this issue revolves around the question, why should I participate if I am going to receive the benefits either way? There are an abundant amount of theories on how to resolve these problems. Two opposing views to overcome this problem suggest small groups and the theory of Conditional Corporation.
Olson says it best on page 63, “The large, ‘latent’ group, on the other hand, always contains more people than could possibly know each other, and is not likely (except when composed of federated small groups) to develop social pressures that would help it satisfy its interest in a collective good.” Olson’s main point is that small groups are easier to monitor than a large group. Small groups have the advantage of recognizing and knowing everyone in the group, so if someone is missing it will be noticeable. Mariah brings up a good point that we discussed in class about small groups as well. She discusses how small groups help the members believe that there presence and participation is very important. On the other hand, members of large groups pass the responsibly off to the vast amount of people involved. Olson and Whitehead do suggest ways for large groups to overcome the free rider problem but there is no doubt that small organizations have an easier time diminishing the free rider problem.
I also agree with Chris in saying that large groups are definitely more effective in American society today then smaller groups. Therefore, in order to be influential most groups need to over come the free rider problem and become larger. I strongly agree with Whitehead’s theory on Conditional Corporation. Conditional Corporation is described nicely in Whitehead’s article page 3, “there exists ‘social interaction effects,’ whereby people’s behavior is influenced by their group mates.” Whitehead places great importance on people participating in large groups. The incentive to participate lays largely in the fact that the only way to get you opinion heard is by speaking up. All of this relates back to the penny game that we played in class, if you knew your partner is going to corporate then you would most likely do the same. However, if your partner betrayed you then you would no longer have an incentive to corporate. If lots of people participate in large groups many will follow solely for the enormous amount of corporation.
In conclusion, while Olson makes many valid points with his small group concept, I believe that the data found in Whitehead’s article is correct in saying that, possibility the most efficient way to over come the free rider problem is through understanding Conditional Corporation.
Groups are brought togehter by a common interest. Olson quotes aristotle in chapter one as he says "Men journey together with a view of particular advantage and by way of providing some particular thing needed for the purpose of life...". When man comes together like that it causes the free rider problem. As we learned in class the free rider problem is the essence of why some interests groups form and others do not. What brings interests groups together is a common interest, however, what separates them is how they can over come the free rider problem. For instance, small groups where everyone in the group benefits from it do not necessarily have a free rider problem. The free rider problem comes with the intermediate and larger( latent) groups. Intermediate groups can often overcome the free rider problem due to the fact they each person in the group can make a difference and that each persons participation can often result in failure or success of the group. Success in a group has to do with a few things such as; conditional cooperation, notions of the community and incentives or what people get from these groups.
ReplyDeleteOlson uses labor uses as an example of who overcomes the free rider problem. As a whole it is hard for individual laborers to get themselves what they want. Labor unions are an example of a federation. Which instead of one big union making it hard to get what they want, one big union is broken down into several smaller ones and When broken down into smaller unions these organizations can get a lot done for their laborers such as higher wages, better working conditions, benefits, etc. With all these common incentives there is conditional cooperation between the laborers of these labor unions thus an example of a latent group overcoming the free rider problem. Federation of large groups is how labor unions survive.
With SALA it is a different story, I agree with another classmate that they have started to overcome but have not yet overcome the free rider problem. In Whitehead's article she makes it clear that large interests groups are the groups that will have the most difficulty with the free rider problem. Now that SALA has reached out to the SGA and the student body they are making themslves a larger group on a daily basis which will make it hard for them to overcome the free rider problem due to the fact that SALA is large enough where each persons small participation can help however, SALA can not monitor everyones participation . I think SALA will ultimately have trouble getting people to march on Charleston due to the fact that the student body is to big. Many people will hear their message but most people will assume that their participation will not determine the outcome due to the fact that the group they are trying to get together is just to large. I think that SALA will fall victim to the free rider problem as many other latent groups do.
The free-rider problem is the biggest obstacle on starting and maintaining an interest group. Most interest groups do not make it because of the free-riders, the interest groups that do make it all have similar, if not the same, strategy to beat the free-riders. Most of the winning strategies require some type of collaboration from another group of business. Those seem to be the most affective, and my favorite solution to the free-rider.
ReplyDeleteFor example, when we learned about SALA in class they discussed how they were partnered with the SGA on this issue. The SGA has been around for a long time at WVU and it well-known and respected. When the SGA recommends its members to look into SALA that is huge for a young, relatively unknown organization. A good way to start your interested group and recruit active members is to partner with bigger, established groups on certain issues.
I think an incentive program is the best way to eliminate the free-rider. If SALA gave active participants a card or something to identify themselves and partnered with the bookstores or local restaurants they would get a lot more support. If SALA was offering active members 10% off at the bookstore or Rusted Musket, I would not hesitate to join.
Olsen speaks about how smaller interest groups is better and more affective about attacking its causes than a large one. Olsen believes the smaller group will hold members to a higher accountability and with a small and active group it will be easier to come to a consensus on their opinions. I agree with that, but I also feel a large group has its advantages too. Large groups get most of their power from the amount of people. And usually have elected or appointed individuals telling the members what to do, where to go, how to vote. A big group with a strong cause would beat a small group with a strong cause.
The Whitehead article talks about conditional cooperators, which is pretty much saying “I’ll do it if you do it”. He had some interesting points to back up this theory, but we did an experiment in class that makes me question if this would actually work. When we played the game choosing heads or tails a lot of groups conditionally cooperated for the first 8 or 9 times, but then they thought they could get an advantage on the last time or 2. So they pretended to be conditional cooperators until they saw a chance to put themselves in a better position, and the group in a worse position. This experiment makes me think that would happen with Whitehead’s theory of conditional cooperation.
Christopher Cymny
The free rider problem is major problem that interest groups face. Namely it is the idea that a person can get the most benefit for the least amount of work. It is when a person attempts to make a point by joining an interest group but does not actually actively support the group. Instead he only belongs for the benefits that the group provides. Olson explains that there are many different benefits that can help to reduce the impact of the free rider problem. Namely large organizations like AARP use selective benefits given only to the members of that particular organization. These economic benefits would be things like discounts at restaurants, and trips around the world, which are only given to members of the organization. However this still doesn’t completely eliminate the free-rider problem, as you can have members simply joining for the economic benefits and possibly completely disagree with the ideas. Other types of selective benefits are solidary benefits. Solidary benefits are in groups in which members feel included, and liked, and they join for companionship, and be with other like-minded people. A good example of this would be students over at the Newman Center. These students go for the companionship of being with people of the same religion, or share the same general belief. However there are some who just go for the social events, and do not get entirely active in the organization. Another benefit is called expressive benefits when a group of people can come together over a particular issue, however this type of emotional response is fleeting, and it will eventually fade out as the issue becomes less prominent. A good example of this is the days after 9-11 the federal government had the support of the large majority of the population to go to war to fight terrorism, however after ten years the emotions that exploded after the attacks faded, and there was less support for having troops in the Middle East. However as emotions dwindle support moves on to another issue the free rider problem shows its ugly head.
ReplyDeleteAccording to Olson, another way to overcome the free rider problem rather than just benefits is through the size of the particular group. There are three different types of groups in this sense. One type of group that we have is the latent group. In large latent groups a single individual person can feel invisible, and get around having to actively participate in the group because the group is just too large to make sure that everybody helps out. The member can literally get a free ride along with all the benefits, but none of the actual work. Next we have the privileged group. These groups are usually very small and have close observation on each other, but they do not usually have the numbers to actually stand out on an issue. Finally we have the intermediate group. This is the best way to control the free rider problem, and still have a decent sized group backing the issue. The intermediate group has decent size, yet it is still small enough where all the members can monitor each other to make sure everybody is participating equally.
This introduces a concept of conditional cooperation. Professor Whitehead says conditional cooperation is the idea that if one person cooperates, then I will absolutely cooperate next time. This is done extremely easily in an intermediate interest group since the members are already keeping tabs on each other. So they know that if one person is there consistently, then they can cooperate with that person since they can be certain that they will help out in the future. This idea can bring interest groups together as long as there is no definite end to the interest group. I’d say that the best way to solve the free rider problem would be to have a large group that is broken up into smaller intermediate sized groups. These smaller groups can easily be monitored by the other members in their group, yet they would be involved with the larger organization which can monitor all the groups as a whole to make sure that each group is working equally.
Schuyler Harvath
I believe that the reason why some large interest groups overcome the free-rider problem is because of a multitude of factors. First, arguably the easiest way for groups to overcome the free-rider problem is by simply having the government provide the service or good and charging a collective tax from all citizens. Getting the government to provide a good or service that is in your groups self-interest can be quite difficult, however, as we have seen with President Obama's Affordable Care Act (aka "Obamacare"). A second way to overcome the free-rider problem, another arguably easy way, is to have what we discussed in class as a "privileged" group. In this type of group, one person (or small group) provides all of the selective incentives for the larger group. Selective incentives come in many forms though. They can be economic, which organizations like AARP and AAA provide to there members whenever they would like discounts to eat out, stay at a hotel, etc., soldiery, which public service groups like the Boy Scouts of America provide with their high levels of social interaction, or they can be expressive, which groups like the ACLU provides in promoting individual liberties and rights. Another way that large groups can overcome the free-rider problem is by creating a federation (as Olsen suggested). The way a federation works is that a larger group would split into smaller groups that could monitor each other. We discussed this in-depth in relation to SALA and their conquest to overcome the free-rider problem by getting students to join them in Charleston. One way SALA could use a federation style approach to overcoming the problem is by partnering with social organizations that already exist, like fraternities, sororities, and honor societies. SALA has already been somewhat successful in obtaining the backing from SGA. SALA could be more successful if they could get more social organizations to join their cause, this way, the organizations could look after each other and punish the other if the do not participate.
ReplyDeleteIn relation to Olsen's and Whitehead's approaches to overcoming the free-rider problem, they take somewhat different approaches. As one of the colleagues, Michael Quillen, said, "Whitehead gears her argument towards why 'conditional cooperation' is overwhelmingly difficult to deal with in larger groups." This is quite different from Olsen's approach of focusing on organizational make-up of groups (i.e. creating federations, relying on selective incentives and monitoring participation). Both authors provide great analysis and solutions for overcoming the free-rider problem, but I do think that I have to agree with Whitehead's argument more than Olsen's for one major reason: I think Olsen over-estimates the importance of selective incentives on an self-interested individual, and the social punishment that may come from monitoring other groups in a federation. For example, even though AARP has thousands of members as part of its interest group, not all of the members are in agreement in the groups goals -- they are simply a member to obtain AARP's selective incentive discounts. These people, therefore, would never physically go out and champion the organizations goals. That is why I agree with Whitehead's focus on the "belief of cooperation." As we saw with our experiment in class, once individuals were allowed to talk to one another about their beliefs and form a plan, individuals were much more likely to cooperate. Without the belief that individuals in an organization will cooperate with each other, it is very unlikely that an organization could overcome the free-rider problem.
The free rider problem is difficult to deal with and is an issue in many large interest groups. Some large groups have an easier time dealing with this issue than others. Selective incentives are one way groups can attempt to get around this as they give members extra motivation to participate. This is best illustrated by the in class discussion we had about AARP. Its millions of members are receive numerous club benefits for their participation, and it undoubtedly makes the cost of membership seem more worth it. Compulsory membership is also an option. Labor unions are mandatory for workers in certain professions, and whether or not workers choose to participate outside of their membership fee, that fee alone counts as a contribution.
ReplyDeleteWhat Professor Whitehead refers to as “conditional cooperation” in her article could serve as a primary reason as to why large groups either do or do not overcome the free rider problem. If an individual member thinks that others are going to do their part, they are more likely to do theirs. If they think that others will try to do the bare minimum and not offer any significant contributions to the group, they will think they cannot individually change the outcome and proceed to do the same. The SALA discussion in class is a good example of this. Students could either participate because others are showing a willingness to participate, or free ride because they see that the others are free riding as well. I believe that the only way to effectively eliminate the free rider problem is to keep a group as small as possible so that the individual participation (or lack thereof) of members is more noticeable. Incentives should be offered for achievement, and people should be penalized for sub-par participation.
The free rider problem is unfortunately a persistent problem in interest groups. Though it should not come as a surprise, especially in the United States where our citizens are notorious for general laziness and wanting others to 'get the job done' for them. In the case of SALA, yes it is very probable that there would be a low turn out, especially in the season we are having. It makes much more sense for me to stay home and save money and let thirty dedicated students advocate on my behalf. But what if they are successful? Or, what if they are providing other incentives for me to drive to Charleston? If they are successful even if I'm not there, I'm much more likely to want to participate in their group the next time they do something. I'll probably even attend more meetings if I see they're making progress. People want to be a part of success. Even if they aren't the initial contributors, they will most likely want to hop on the bandwagon.
ReplyDeleteOlson talks of the privileged group, and how they are able to keep the free rider problem in check because typically they are able to finance their own projects without government intervention. This is also because they are a small group. In latent groups, Olson gave a few suggestions on overcoming free riders. One of them is the Expressive incentive, which is the benefit one gets from taking a stand for something he or she believes in. This incentive would be a perfect example for SALA. Students would join because it affects them or their friend or their neighbor. It's something to get fired up about and go to Charleston for. The only problem with expressive incentives is that people's interests change over time. What you feel passionate about today is likely to change in a year.
Whitehead takes on the position of conditional cooperation. This is, a certain number of people will cooperate with a plan of action if others will. Despite her findings of a large number of people conditional cooperators, there is still a fraction of free riders. For instance, she found in a study that in a donation experiment, students who expect others to donate are more likely to donate themselves. And if they thought more students had previously made a donation, they also were more likely to donate.
So in theory, it seems as though latent groups would be the most successful if they had some type of check system. If one is to join an interest group (such as SALA) then perhaps they should immediately be welcomed by a smaller number of people within the group. That way accountability is held, and one is more likely to participate rather than existing as just a number in a large group.
As my classmates have stated time and time again the problem for latent groups is how to overcome the free-rider problem efficiently and effective. Large groups have the greatest problem overcoming this problem because as Olson illustrates in his book, rational people know that their efforts in a group are not going to be the sole deciding factor in a group’s decision to do anything. This is why large groups have such a problem overcoming the problem. The free-rider problem is easy for small, “privileged” and “intermediate” groups, because in smaller groups the actions and work of individuals are more important and more likely to make a difference in the overall success of the group. So the question remains, how does a latent interest group overcome the free rider problem in an effective manner?
ReplyDeleteOlson gives many different options for facing the free rider problem such as incentives. People want to be part of a group that allows them to gain something in return for their time, dedication, and support. Joining a group must be low cost to the member. Why join a group if they can reap the benefits from the group without participating. Why should students march on Charleston for lower tuition if they can gain the benefits from others doing so? If the legislature agreed to pass legislation to lower tuition every student would receive those benefits. They will not pick and choose. One possibility is provide incentives to group members. Some latent interest groups are better at providing the right incentives to their members and this allows them to be successful in their quest for participation and minimizes the free-rider problem. We talked about economic, expressive, and solidary incentives. While economic incentives are a great resource to large groups they do not necessarily work all the time.
If we look at SALA, this group is not offering any kind of economic incentive. So what can SALA offer members? SALA can offer expressive and solidary incentives. A person can add they were a student advocate for legislative advancement to their resume, it means something and if they accomplish stopping a bill or two, or engage in a protest that allows law makers to change their votes regarding issues of importance to students; they may gain reward from that. Their incentive may be for moral reasons. Helping others and doing the right thing can bring a lot of people in because having a moral compass appeals to a lot of people. SALA is easy to join, and it has a core group of passionate students who care about particular issues SALA is always working on something and while a specific topic might not be of interest to an individual the benefits of being a part of the group and supporting an issue can be beneficial to when there is an issue the individual is passionate about. If individuals show support to an issue that others are passionate about it is more likely that the support will come back around later on. As Mr. Ralston pointed out earlier, a federation is another way of curbing the free-rider problem. SALA could be considered part of a federation. SALA used to be held prior to SGA meetings and was born out of a SGA idea. Over time it has become its own entity, even though it is still closely related to SGA.
Lastly, to address the article by Professor Whitehead. She discusses voluntary and conditional cooperation and how these play a part of the free-rider problem. The idea of conditional cooperation is if you cooperate, I will cooperate and while this works for a while it could have opposite effects as some of us saw in the game we played last week. Whitehead points out that voluntary cooperation is extremely sensitive and states that when people experience free riding they are more likely to stop cooperating, which makes sense. Conditional cooperation plays a big role in explaining the free rider problem and as Professor Whitehead stated at the end of her paper, this is just a starting mark for future discussion and study into policy, group make up and the free-rider.
Olson and Whitehead cleverly depict the free riding problem. While both individuals state solutions to help overcome this problem, I believe Whitehead with conditional cooperation is a major factor in large groups but cannot sustain a large group. For an example of Occupying Wall Street. Many Large groups rallied to protest on the beginning, to show support for the movement. The movement first started June 9th 2011 with the register of a web address. The Occupying Wall Street movement was started, however the last event this movement had completed was in September 17, 2012, where as of now was the last protest resulted in 185 arrested.
ReplyDeleteThe NRA was founded November 17, 1871. The primary movement concern is the protection of the Second Amendment for all Americans. Once you join this group you gain privileges which gives the members certain incentives. The NRA is so vast and powerful that certain members are getting caught the public view. This is why the NRA monitors its members. I believe that this is the reason why the NRA has lasted of 142 years.
Interest groups exist in all sorts of scenarios and form from a group of people that have a general common interest. Typically the smaller of these groups form much easier than the larger ones. This is due to the Free Rider Problem, the smaller groups everyone knows that they have to do their part for the group to be successful. However, with the larger latent groups if the members start to weigh out the cost to the profits they may not contribute because they may figure that their own contribution will not matter to the group. In this case they don’t contribute, but still profit from the group’s effort. This shows how the Free Rider Problem can affect larger interest groups.
ReplyDeleteOlson in his book talks about the struggle with the Free Rider Problem, and how most large groups can’t hurdle it. He talks about two ways in which these groups can overcome it, if it is done correctly. One being Federation, and in doing this you take a large interest group such as a labor union and you break it down in to smaller more cohesive groups that have things in common. I myself am part of a federation, I work for Kroger’s and belong to the United Food and Commercial Workers Union (UFCW). This is a huge union that works with people all over the country, but they need to make sure everyone participates and in doing so they created local unions that take care of a smaller area. My local is number 23 and spans Morgantown to Clarksburg. Secondly, Olson uses is Economic Incentives which these larger groups can give something back to its members for doing their part. A great example of this is AARP; they offer their member’s discounts to places that partner with AARP.
Professor Whitehead mentions the idea of Conditional Cooperation, which is the thought that the members of a group will only do as much as they believe the other people are doing. This idea would allow a large interest group to get over the Free Rider Program as long as everyone in the group is contributing. This brings me to the SALA group in which the idea of Conditional Cooperation would help them establish their group. If everyone that was a member of the Facebook group was to do their part in this group and go to Charleston protesting with this larger group of people will allow SALA to overcome the Free Rider Problem.
Chris Nelson
ReplyDeleteThe free rider problem is something that any interest group has to face. It's the simple question of why would I join or do something when I might get to receive the benefits from it anyway. In the case of SALA, most students will not be willing to go down to Charleston to try to get tuition lowered due to the costs of doing so and the fact that if the students who do go are successful in their goal, all students will have lower tuition. The larger the group, the more chance there is for the free rider problem.
Olson mentions that some ways to overcome the free rider problem are to keep the groups small. The smaller the group is, the more a person feels that their participation matters (The dairy farmers were used as an example in class). Another way is to use federation (ex. Labor unions) and have overlapping activities where you can apply social incentives. Which is Olson's next point about providing selective incentives for those who join the group. They are economic incentives, solidarity incentives, and expressive incentives. All three are different, but all provide some benefit to you joining the group. This idea makes the most sense to me because no one does something unless they get some benefit whether it be physical or mental.
Whitehead talks about conditional cooperation being a way to overcome the free rider problem in large groups. Conditional cooperation is basically just saying that if you are willing to do this, then I will do the same. But this will only work if all members of the group are willing to abide by this. Some may not ever want to do anything, some may not like the other person they are conditionally cooperating with and will not do what they should because of that. Also, if someone feels like they are doing more than another person, they may stop doing there share because the others are free riding.
The free rider problem is something groups that hope to accomplish something must overcome. Groups as small as sports teams to as large as interest groups have to deal with this problem and have come up with multiple ideas in order to avoid the free rider problem. In the Olsen reading he provides a theory of providing selective incentives to participants. He uses the example of AAA who provides its members with incentives such as roadside assistance, giving a tow if your broke down and unlocking your car if you locked your keys inside. This is a good way of overcoming the problem because individuals have a reason to participate because they get something back in return. Another example of overcoming the free rider problem is conditional cooperators as provided by Whitehead. This theory says that individuals of a group participate actively as long as the other individuals in the group do the same. If a person chooses not to cooperate, the other individuals in the group will also not cooperate.
ReplyDeleteOne of the best ways to avoid the free rider problem while trying to start an interest group is to start small. If the group trying to accomplish a goal is small enough the members of it can be easily monitored by each other and therefore have more incentive to participate. Being easily monitored is also beneficial because if a member is not pulling their weight, other members can provide some incentive for them to work harder or kick them out. Smaller groups are also usually formed by people who are very interested in the problem they are trying to deal with so they will be more inclined to help. In larger groups however the individuals are not easily monitored and do not feel that their participation is needed therefore causing a large free rider problem.
The free rider problem is a concern to all groups no matter how small or how big, but there are steps that can be taken in order to overcome the problem and move forward. As stated earlier starting small, providing selective incentives, and conditional cooperation between all of the members of the group are all ways to effectively reduce and eliminate the free rider problem.
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ReplyDeleteThe free rider problem has been a serious economic issue that plagues many groups. Because the goods received from these groups are generally collective goods that means people will receive the good whether or not they participated. Olsen uses three groups as his example, the intermediate, latent, and the privileged group. In the intermediate group,; while it is small, these people are very invested in the cause/outcome. In the latent group the members have less interest in the outcome/cause and there are much more people. Finally, in the privileged group, they gain more from the goods than it would cost for them to provide. The intermediate group doesn’t have problem overcoming the free rider problem, the latent group however does have a difficult time overcoming the free rider problem. Olsen explains that the larger groups have a harder time overcoming this problem because each person doesn’t have the same incentive, the organizational costs rise over time, and the benefits don’t outweigh the costs. One of the ways to alleviate this problem is through incentives. There are many different incentives that can lure an individual to a group; economic, expressive, and solidarity. As discussed in class different groups like the NRA and AARP both offer incentives to the individuals in their groups. I think Olsen’s theory would only work on a small scale such as getting something passed a city council. Small groups, unless they have the ability to fundraise on a massive scale, just don’t have the leverage it takes to get a law passed through the state legislature. There’s power in numbers, and there’s a reason the NRA has as much influence as it does.
ReplyDeleteWhitehead critiques voluntary cooperation because it is in everyone self-interest to reap the benefits of a group and simultaneously not volunteer their own time. Whitehead stresses the importance of “conditional cooperation”, in where if the individuals believe that others will cooperate, than they will cooperate as well. I think if you applied both Olsen and Whiteheads theories together it could work. For instance, if you just charged all the individuals a fee to be in the group, and left the actual lobbying and discussions to a few that have the ability and know how, I think that could work and solve the free rider problem on a bigger scale. Bigger groups have more success because they divide into chapters, and divide the responsibilities. This is how you keep Olsen’s “small group success” on a national or subnational scale and overcome the “free rider problem”.
The free rider problem is an issue when trying to form any group for a purpose where there is no employment or compensation to members for taking part. Many ways that interest groups fail to form or fail to remain intact once formed are that perhaps they are too large/broad to keep focus of members, they don't have any sort of policing/effective leadership organization set up, or they don't offer their members any incentives for taking part.
ReplyDeleteThere are several ways to overcome the free rider problem. Olsen states that offering incentives is the most effective method. An example of this would be AARP, which provides its members with discounts from many leading businesses nationwide if they are members. Whitehead states that another very effective method is the use of conditional cooperation. An example of this could be a town committee that forms to save a park from turning into an apartment complex. One individual is likely to attend meetings as long as others do, which could lead to the group's success. But if one individual stops coming to meetings, others will likely use it as an excuse for them to not come as well, and the group will likely fail.
The best ways to overcome the free rider problem are to have a very specific goal, start small so members can easily interact, motivate, and police each other, offer incentives to members that will make their cooperation worthwhile (and motivate others to get involved), and seek help from an already established and strong group. If a group can get through the initial stages and overcome the free rider, they have a great chance to succeed.
Christopher Skidmore
After having read the ideas of Olsen, Whitehead, and what we’ve discussed in class, I’ve come to the conclusion that it seems very hard to overcome the free rider as long as the benefits remain as small as they tend to. The idea that keeping the group small will be of benefit to the group is of course right. On the other hand, like many have mentioned before me, you can’t accomplish all that much with a smaller group.
ReplyDeleteWhen I think of outside examples of larger groups that have overcome the free rider problem, I think of the Arab spring and the revolutions that are going on across the world, Ukraine being the latest example. In these countries the people have seemingly overcome the free rider problem much due to the fact that people feel the need to participate and high stakes involved. I believe it’s very similar to a domino effect where people look at what others do and join. Whitehead talks about this in depth and mentions a number of experiments where the theory has been confirmed. The example of how students were more likely to donate if they thought that other people had donated to the university, shows how weak people are for peer pressure and tend to follow the stream. Another example was how more people donated to a box filled with money compared to one that was empty. Again, this confirms the idea of how we follow the stream in society. With that said, I guess the way to overcome the free rider problem is to simply make it a matter of importance and have people feel the need to join because of social reasons. This is why an organization like SPAN would have great chance of overcoming the free rider problem, as the stakeholders (the students) live closely together, share the same values, and would all benefit from the end result. Larger groups can succeed, but most of them are just latent groups as Olsen calls them. Groups where you feel like your contribution doesn’t matter.
-Carl Bojesson
After the discussions of class and reading the texts, it seems clear that free rider problem is a difficult obstacle in group formation, but not one that is impossible to overcome. Olson points out that ordinary non-collective goods can be produced by individual action like businesses, but group action will always be paramount in obtaining common collective goods. I agree with this idea, and it is reinforced every time a community comes together to call for street lights or traffic lights. These collective goods are necessities, and when a group wants to attain something they must come together and all contribute. Olson says that groups must create lobbying organizations when trying to pressure official decision makers to aid them. Large groups have the power to persuade when a group considers the obtainment of a need an emergency, and when it is sought after by enough people.
ReplyDeleteIn the case of a problem less apparent than a lack of street lights, there is a stronger chance of the free rider problem becoming too difficult to beat. In the example of the SALA group, they want to lower tuition rates for students. As a student I am personally not fully aware of how my tuition is evaluated, or how I will even pay for college at the end of my student career. This kind of ignorance is shared by many people that I know, who are also too busy with school and their social lives to keep up with such delayed matters. This is my example of how SALA is being affected by the free rider problem. They only advertise on Facebook and, to my knowledge, have been covered once by the student paper. The are somewhat low key, so with the combination of the groups small size, and the large problem they are trying to address, it will be difficult for them to gain members who care enough about a confusing issue to spend the time exerting their energy to the cause, despite its relevance to the student body. Also, there is no guarantee that effort will lower the participating students' tuition, so the self interest disappears when the incentive to participate does as well. Whitehead suggests that the personal incentives of altruism and that good feeling of participating, are independent from peoples' cooperative behavior in a group. With empirical evidence on participant behavior, Whitehead makes a valid point in assessing that most people are free riders. I feel that unless an issue is clear enough to address head on, then people will be less active in a given group, thus continuing the annoying pains of the free rider problem. There are no wrong answers here, and both Olson and Whitehead make valid observations.
The free rider problem is an issue that all interest groups must face, however, according to Olson, the smaller, latent groups are more able to overcome the problem. With smaller interest groups it is easier to offer incentives to those who actively participate, while in the larger groups the incentives are few and far between as every member would have to be taken care of. Some larger interest are able to overcome the free rider problem by joining with other, already established groups. An example would be the WVU SALA group. Though they are still trying to get support for their trip to Charleston, they began their group with the support of the SGA and it’s members.
ReplyDeleteI think that Olson made a very good point about the size of a group and it’s ability to function. With a smaller group the incentives are easier to promise, getting organized would be easier, and should the group want to expand it can federate thus keeping the actual group small while still gaining more support.
Whitehead’s article about conditional cooperation made some very good points. A group will last and overcome the free rider problem as long as everyone is cooperating together. In order to cooperate together they need to share common interests. Whitehead shows how this works through many experiments and evidence. Even when the free-riders who all share the interest of “free riding” are put into a group they began to cooperate with each other. Although, from the many group projects I have done in college, I wonder how often this would actually work.
The free-rider problem is something that large groups need to overcome in order to become successful. "Free-riders" are always going to exist simply because many figure that they can receive the same benefits in something for doing nothing, as if they were a person who was putting forth all of the effort toward that goal. After reading Olson and the article I believe that free-riding is almost impossible to stop in cases where groups are large. Groups need to be large to be recognized and have it be talked about by many people and in different places but not everyone is going put forth as much effort as some people.
ReplyDeleteSALA is a perfect example of how people will always free-ride. Although, SALA makes great points about how much students are over paying and it can make people notice, it couldn't possibly make enough people notice to do something about it. With how much time and effort classes require, a social life, staying active, and working to have pocket money, many simply don't have time to work as hard as some might. Whithead talks about "conditional cooperation", but this is only successful if everyone in the group works equally as hard. Conditional cooperation can work better with a smaller group but as I mentioned before, it is hard to get something done with a little amount of people. The only way to overcome the free rider problem is to have enough personal incentives for everyone to want to contribute. I guess it isn't impossible because some groups have started from nothing. Overall, you just need to have great cooperation and communication amongst your group. If every person is working hard to get what they want, and letting each other know that they all will benefit them.
Grant Easterday